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ABSTRACT This paper examines a contemporary antagonism in gendered safety discourses; the imperative to be free in public space against the obligation to be safe and ‘properly’ feminine. We argue that this produces (and is produced by) contemporary rape culture, which might be contested through recourse to an agonistic ethic.  Using qualitative interview data we examine how participants contest victim-blaming discourses, whilst simultaneously limiting how far they will accept the female body’s right to occupy public space.  This paper has significant implications for approaching social justice, in particular justice for women and their right to occupy public space.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Woman is present in cities as temptress, as whore, as fallen woman, as lesbian, but also 
as virtuous woman in danger, as heroic womanhood who triumphs over temptation and 
tribulation. (Wilson, 1991: 6) 
 
Jill Meagher was raped and murdered on the streets of Melbourne, Australia on 21st September 
2012. A few days later, once her body had been discovered and the events of the attack 
ascertained through the piecing together of CCTV footage, a Reclaim the Night march took 
place on the street where Meagher’s image was last captured. The case – from Meagher’s 
disappearance to the detainment, trial and eventual incarceration of her assailant, Adrian Ernest 
Bayley – received world-wide media attention and comment. Sasha Chambers, a woman in the 
crowd outside the court when Bayley was sentenced, explained how these events affected her: 
‘What occurred to Jill, I thought that could happen to anyone … I wear flat shoes, I 
don't wear high heels, I make sure I'm in a group when I'm wearing them. I don't drink 
alcohol anymore … It has impacted my life’ (cited in Independent [Ireland], 2013) 
These events, and the relationships between them, capture a contemporary antagonism 
concerning women’s bodies in public space that we interrogate in this paper: the tension 
between the imperative to be free – to reclaim the night – and the obligation to be safe in public 
spaces. We examine how this tension emerges through discourses of personal freedom and 
personal responsibility. We also situate this antagonism within a public sphere of political 
contestation characterised by an agonistic ethic. Within liberal democracies, at least, we 
suggest that one strategy for feminist challenges to the proper constitution of femininity lies in 
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bringing these antagonisms into the public political sphere – not for debate, but for a more 
thorough transformation.  
The attack of Jill Meagher confronts us with the actualisation of a number of rape myths; a 
violent ‘stranger-rape’ and murder of a woman in a public space, who was walking home alone, 
at night, after drinking some alcohol. We are then confronted by a feminist protest march about 
women’s bodies which proclaims their right to occupy public space, to participate in its 
production, to transform what public space does, and to transform power relations therein 
(Lefebvre, 1996). However, in Chamber’s response, above, we are equally confronted by the 
established tropes and techniques of safety that are addressed to women’s bodies in public 
space (Gardner, 1990; Stanko, 1996; Brooks, 2011). These confrontations – as Elizabeth 
Wilson (1991) suggests above – inherit a nineteenth-century construction of women’s bodies 
in urban public space as a problem without an easy solution. 
In this paper, we argue that the problematic body of the woman in public – too often 
discursively framed through idealised figures (the temptress, the whore, the virtuous) – is 
produced through various interlocking dispositifs1 that construct appropriate femininity, 
anxiety about who has the right to occupy public space, and contemporary preoccupations with 
security that become enforced through ‘sexual vigilance’. Sexual vigilance, we argue, is a mode 
of ‘active subjectification’ which organises how female bodies should appear, occupy and 
travel in public spaces (Foucault, 1982). The form of sexual vigilance which is produced 
through these interlocking dispositifs is forged through discursive imperatives to be properly 
feminine, to adhere to established gender norms, to protect and safeguard the self and 
constructions of the self. Such sexual vigilance is, we suggest, one way in which the problem 
of the female body in public space is discursively ‘solved’. The apparent antagonisms that 
accompany discourses about Meagher’s death provide us with a lens through which to 
interrogate the work that this dispositif does and to consider what might be possible if this 
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antagonism was to be conceptualised otherwise. As public responses to the Meagher murder 
demonstrate, one of the key ways in which control over women’s bodies operates is through 
the mobilisation of the imperative for safety and avoidance of risk in public spaces. Here, these 
imperatives emerge through the production and reproduction of the female body as out of place 
in public space.  
The virgin/whore dichotomy is a well-established and much-critiqued construct within 
contemporary discourses about (in)appropriate femininity (Brownmiller, 1975; Smith, 2013). 
However, the dispositifs that police femininity and that construct and sustain this construct are 
themselves reliant on the continued proliferation of this binary for their constitution. Within 
this feedback loop, the female body becomes a site of scrutiny; the locus upon which judgments 
of appropriate femininity are made. In the aftermath of Meagher’s rape and murder, much was 
made of what she was wearing and what she was doing prior to her attack. As CCTV film 
footage of the night of the attack demonstrates, Meagher can be seen walking alone on the 
pavement of a deserted street at 1.30am2. In numerous news articles and online commentary, 
we are told she was on her way home; we are told she had been out drinking. We are also told 
she was married, professionally successful, young and beautiful. Meagher’s decision to walk 
alone, in high heels, late at night and after drinking alcohol were strongly scrutinised by some 
members of the public posting comments on social network sites (Ford, 2012; Stockwell, 
2012). Through discourses of the ideal victim (Christie, 1986; Walklate, 2011), the incident of 
the rape and murder comes to serve as an allegory for other women about the importance of 
avoiding risk, of staying safe and of taking measures to secure their safety. Yet both the 
discourses about how women secure their safety in public space and the scrutiny of Meagher’s 
body and performance were also accompanied by counter discourses which pointed to 
Meagher’s ‘right’ to occupy public space at night – to dress and act freely in public. Indeed, 
the decision to hold a protest march on the site of her disappearance was intended to contest 
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these victim-blaming discourses and to make claims for women and their right to occupy public 
space. It is the apparent antagonism and oscillation between these different positions – and 
their relation to how sexual vigilance polices women’s bodies in public space – that interests 
us here. In order to examine this, we draw on data collected in qualitative interview material 
acquired through fieldwork at two SlutWalk3 anti-rape protest marches in the United Kingdom 
in 2011 and 2012. We sought to examine contemporary discourses regarding women’s spatial 
practices, the imperative to avoid risk in public space and the way in which women’s bodies 
are figured in these discussions. The methodology is more comprehensively outlined in a 
previous discussion of these themes (Author 2 and Author 1, 2013). We interviewed 17 women 
and 7 men. Purposive sampling of participants in feminist anti-rape protests was chosen 
because we are interested in the role of feminist claims to the freedom in public space in 
constituting the antagonism with imperatives to secure the self. Interviews took place in pairs 
or in groups ranging in size from 2 to 10 people. The data that we cite here were from interviews 
lasting between 30-40 minutes. Interviewees were from a variety of racial and ethnic groups 
and ranged in age from 18 to mid-50s. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using 
an in-depth discourse analysis approach (Hook, 2001; Waitt, 2010).  
Our analysis of these participant discourses extends beyond Boutellier’s (2004) theorisation of 
the ‘safety utopia’ by showing how the antagonism between the imperative to be free to occupy 
public space and the imperative to take responsibility for the avoidance of risk in such spaces 
needs to be understood as produced within the dispositif of sexual vigilance. Bringing a 
Foucaultian perspective to bear, we argue that the simultaneous appeals to freedom and to 
internalised self-control and responsibilisation are not opposed, but are rather part of the same 
problem of governmentality within a broader apparatus of securitisation. Not only does this 
argument have implications for social justice and the right to occupy public space, but it also 
has implications for how the production of appropriate femininities is understood as a 
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governmental project. The latter parts of the paper borrow from Mouffe’s (2000) 
conceptualisation of agonistic pluralism in order to think about how the antagonism between 
freedom and control relies upon the privatisation of questions about the production of women’s 
bodies, practice and subjectivity. Mouffe’s theorisation of agonism also allows us to suggest 
how these questions can be admitted into the public sphere of political contestation and struggle 
– an important strategy for challenging the proper constitution of femininity in public space.  
GOVERNMENTALITY AND SEXUAL VIGILANCE 
Women, as Stanko (1996), Gardner (1990, 1995) and Campbell (2005), amongst others, have 
rightly noted, are more often than not the target of safe-keeping advice than men. Whilst in 
recent years there is an emergent body of research which recognises that men’s relationships 
with fear of attack are present and complex (Day et al, 2003; Moore and Breeze, 2012) female 
bodies continue to be locus of intervention for crime prevention advice. In the Meagher’s case, 
walking home alone, drinking alcohol, wearing high heels were all highlighted by some as 
careless, risky practices. Brooks’s (2011) study of women’s attitudes to safety campaigns 
targeting them demonstrates that whether safety advice is accepted or rejected by women, it 
forms part of a practice of subjectification in public spaces. The same might be said of the 
informal proliferation of safety advice. Even when crime prevention discourses are 
problematised by women – even when they are contested through a Reclaim the Night March, 
or a SlutWalk – they still exert influence in subjectification in their negation. Indeed, as 
Gilchrist et al (1998) demonstrate, although women are not inherently more fearful of crime in 
public space than are men, women’s fear is strongly associated with the performance of 
appropriate femininity, and normative discourses of femininity and masculinity dominate how 
men and women speak about experiences of violence in public space (Hollander, 2001; Author 
1, 2015). This work has implications for our own research; after all, the type of crime that 
women are counselled to avoid through safety strategies is violent crime and sex crime. We 
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argue that there is a socio-cultural investment in producing and reproducing these normative 
gender discourses for these men and women. This finds its way into contemporary 
criminological attitudes to risk management and securitisation in public spaces (Walklate, 
1997, Lee, 2007), and beyond the criminological, into more everyday acts of occupying public 
space (see Scraton and Watson 1998, Thomas, 2004).  
The auto-policing and acts of governmentality that are implied by these iterations of ‘traditional 
gender ideology’ (Hollander, 2001) reflect a shift in contemporary attitudes to understanding 
crime, crime control and victimisation from a focus on the individual deviant criminal towards 
criminogenic situations which might be tackled through risk-averse avoidance strategies 
(O’Malley, 1992; Garland, 1997). Risk, as Douglas (1992) suggests, is calculable and entwined 
with personal responsibility. Foucault (2007) argues that modern states – concerned as they are 
with managing the welfare of populations by analysing threats to welfare in terms of calculable 
risks and probabilities – develop a series of techniques to make individuals take on this 
responsibility for assessing such risks and probabilities. This individualisation of responsibility 
for managing one’s behaviour to maximise safety and welfare – and to minimise risk – is what 
Foucault calls ‘governmentality’. Governmentality becomes especially organised around 
security within what Foucault (2008) understands as ‘neoliberalism’, in which capitalism 
produces a freedom to consume, enjoy, wander and desire in dispersed spaces – a situation that 
requires internalised self-control as a counterpoint to this freedom (Deleuze, 1992). We argue 
that one of the ways that this governmentality operates is through the imperative towards sexual 
vigilance and avoiding risk. This practice is one of the techniques through which appropriate 
femininity might be constituted and sustained. 
For risk is also a deeply gendered and subjective construct, and its cultural relationship to the 
policing of sexuality and vigilance over preserving appropriate femininity should not be 
underestimated (Walklate, 1997; Lupton, 1999). Here, taking risks by walking home alone at 
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night, or drinking too much alcohol, for instance, are constructed as contributing to a flawed 
femininity. As we will discuss later in the paper, the way in which some women discuss their 
ambivalent relationships with feminine sexuality, public space and securitisation can be 
understood as a form of internalised surveillance (vigilance over) of the self (Foucault, 1978: 
100-102, 104; Stanko, 1997). This focus on ‘managing risk’ as opposed to ‘enforcing social 
norms’ (Merry, 2001: 16) within criminological approaches to dealing with crime shifts the 
focus of safekeeping advice away from perpetrators (who – either as ‘rational criminals’ or (as 
we shall see) ‘arseholes’ – cannot be expected to act otherwise) and onto potential victims. The 
governmentality at play here heightens the imperative to care for the self within a strictly risk-
averse moral frame, using rape myths as allegories against a background of rape culture 
wherein the objectification of women-as-problems and permissiveness of violence against 
women is condoned and encouraged. The price of failing at this care is, as O’Byrne and Holmes 
(2007: 95) suggest, shame and personal guilt.  
Yet, as the responses to Meagher’s murder and as the responses from the participants at the 
SlutWalk marches suggest, the internalisation of vigilance over risk figured through a 
constructed association between inappropriate femininity and the threat of violence is also 
antagonistically accompanied by a claim among women to a right and freedom to occupy 
public space. The tension between these positions can usefully be brought into a dialogue with 
Boutellier’s (2004) safety utopia. For Boutellier (2004: 4, 8) the ‘safety utopia’ is an impossible 
desire for a ‘vital society’ in which ‘liberal freedom is to be unreservedly celebrated’ but around 
which boundaries of security are tightly set. In other words, Boutellier suggests that – partially 
through the capitalist, neoliberal imperative to self-determine – we exist in a state of perpetual 
(antagonistic) ambivalence, simultaneously desiring both absolute liberty (in a classically 
liberal sense) and the promise of absolute safety. This ambivalence needs to be understood as 
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a project of governmentality, we would add. It gives rise to anxiety about security in the 
everyday, and also to the imperative to behave responsibly – appropriately – with this freedom. 
Foucault (1984: 113) understands freedom in relation to the care of the self, but the latter cannot 
be understood as only a practice of liberty. Like governmentality, it is also an example of a 
mode of governing the self; the conduct of conduct (Garland, 1997). Foucault's understanding 
of the care of the self is a historical analysis of one mode of the broader question of 
governmentality in which liberty cannot be understood as separate from, or opposed to, control 
and power, but as part of the conditions of that power within particular dispositifs. How has 
this contemporary imperative to work on the self – co-opted insidiously by neoliberal politics 
– transformed our understanding of the project and practice of freedom? 
ANTAGONISMS OF FREEDOM AND SECURITY 
It is not enough simply to suggest that safe-keeping practices that target women as space users 
form part of a broader discourse of victim-blaming. Feminist attempts to contest safekeeping 
and broader dispositifs of control, self-policing and vigilance often run into the difficulty of 
how widespread and deep-seated investments in appropriate femininity as practiced and 
embodied through safekeeping seem to be. In our research, these difficulties are evident in the 
way participants negotiated the various antagonisms between the imperative to be safe and the 
right to freedom.  Again and again, no sooner had a participant critiqued discourses associated 
with ‘victim blaming’, 'rape culture', appropriate femininity or safekeeping than they - or one 
of their friends - would recapitulate some axiom about the dangers women face being by 
themselves in public space and about women's responsibilities to keep themselves safe by 
dressing and behaving appropriately. Sometimes these antagonisms were expressed as apparent 
contradictions in what the participants said, while at other times, participants attempted to 
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account for the difficulties in reconciling their assertions within what discourse analysts 
(Stapleton, 2001: 471) call 'contrastive structures'.  
This dialogic shuttling between different positions in respect of safety and freedom 
demonstrates the antagonism of the position that women occupy in respect of their own sense 
of self and relationship with, and rights to, public space. We suggest that by approaching these 
dialogic tensions through a theorisation of antagonism and agonism, we might better 
interrogate the role that imperatives towards sexual vigilance play in public space, and the 
implications thereof for the project of the self which is fostered through safekeeping discourses. 
We borrow some of our understanding of antagonism from Mouffe's (2000) and Connolly's 
(2005) radical democratic approaches to thinking about pluralism and the 'relation of political 
adversaries'. The investment of radical democrats such as Mouffe (2000), Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985) and Connolly (2005) in the mainstream political institution of democracy may seem at 
odds with the Foucaultian emphasis on critiquing the operation of governmental power. 
However, we demonstrate that Mouffe's work, in particular, provides rich conceptual resources 
for thinking about how antagonisms are constitutive of who is excluded from the space of the 
public and on what grounds. 
Sexual Desire, Normativity And The Limit to Freedom 
The antagonistic oscillation between making claims to the right to freely occupy public space 
and the desire for safety evokes the limit of how far the women and men to whom we spoke 
will allow women’s freedom to go. Boutellier (2004: 8) makes the point that ‘risk culture’ is 
marked by paradoxical tensions between yearning for ‘expressive uninhibitedness and 
indignation if it goes wrong, between a high level of tolerance and a call for the enforcement 
of the rules.’ We suggest that via the discourse of demanding both freedom and safety, the 
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imperative for sexual vigilance marks, and is marked by, the appropriate and inappropriate 
performance of femininity and the continued proliferation of rape culture.  
This becomes evident in the way that a movement like the SlutWalk organises itself and the 
political terrain upon which it operates. SlutWalk describes itself as a ‘worldwide movement 
against victim-blaming, survivor shaming and rape culture’ (SlutWalk Toronto, n.d.). 
‘Whatever we wear, wherever we go! Yes means yes and no means no!’ is the iconic chant that 
can be heard at this and other anti-rape protest in cities around the world. Such a chant is a 
direct response to the rape culture, the victim-blaming discourses and the safe-keeping advice 
which targets women’s bodies in public space. Making claims both to the freedom to occupy 
public space (‘wherever we go’) and the right to dress freely (‘whatever we wear’) can be seen 
as an explicit rejection of an imperative to be sexually vigilant which emerges through 
safekeeping discourses. Yet, what also appears here, and what therefore marks the limit to this 
freedom, is the fettered expression of female sexual desire.   
In the statement ‘yes means yes and no means no!’ protesters are clearly referencing the 
problem of consent. But they are also referencing a dynamic more subtle than a straightforward 
affirmation of consent; the feminine response to a (presumably, given the heterosexist nature 
of rape culture and the dominant tone of SlutWalk’s politics) masculine question. The answer 
‘yes’ which means yes, and ‘no’ which means no, can only be given in response to a question 
from a silent interlocutor4. Certainly this emphasises the importance of women’s right to 
consent (or not) to sexual activity, but it also discursively, intrinsically, places women in the 
position of responder to the question posed by a faceless – amorphous – other. No space is 
afforded to the potentiality of active female sexual desire or autonomy; rather, women are 
always-already passive in this encounter, neither able to initiate sex or pre-emptively refuse it. 
Holland et al (1994) have identified how this reticence to express autonomous sexual desire 
saturates young women’s accounts of their sexual practices. They argue that this constructs 
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feminine sexual desire as something that is forbidden or taboo. It also complexifies power 
relations within anti-rape and anti-rape culture politics, in part by beginning to cast the 
discursive limit of freedom under a shadow of normative sexual vigilance, so what appears to 
be a call for emancipation operates instead within an economy where women are, in fact, not 
full actors in a heterosexual sexual encounter. It also begins to demonstrate how far men and 
women to whom we spoke are invested in the neoliberalised imperative to care for the self and 
to be free within a prescription of freedom through the operation of compulsory sexual 
vigilance: 
I think women should obviously be allowed to wear what they want, when they want 
to wear it. But I also think you have a personal responsibility to protect yourself. And 
not putting yourself into situations that could be considered dangerous. Um...but yeah, 
so it’s difficult (Sophie, female, mid-late 40s, White British, Interview 1, 2011).  
Sophie's use of the auxiliary verb 'should' to modify the term ‘be allowed to wear’, here, not 
only connotes a political territory on which what is at stake is the control over – and freedom 
of – women's bodies, but also shows how such antagonisms between political positions are 
managed. By deferring the effect of feminist activism into the future, present investments in 
particularly validated modes of subjectivity – such as appropriate femininity – can be left 
unexamined and evidence that contradicts the problems with safekeeping messages can be 
ignored. For despite an apparent critique of victim-blaming discourses, Sophie’s reasoning of 
what behaviour is appropriate and inappropriate in public space is nonetheless curtailed by the 
expression of patriarchal norms. Who, for instance, gives permission for ‘women’ to be 
‘allowed’ to dress as they want? Where does this ethic come from? This extract also places a 
neoliberalised emphasis on individualised freedom and responsibility for security and risk-
avoidance. To be ‘allowed’ to ‘wear what they want’ alongside the ‘personal responsibility to 
protect yourself’ illustrates the antagonism inherent in contemporary attitudes to safekeeping. 
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It captures how the neoliberalisation of the subject forms part of a governmental project of 
ordering, and gendering, public space:  
What we’ve wanted to come along for today is to say that it’s, it’s about, you should be 
able to wear what you want to wear and you shouldn’t be at risk...you should really be 
able to walk down the street naked. It doesn’t mean that you want to be raped. And you 
shouldn’t be judged on what you wear, which is what the policeman was doing. 
Whereas for me I always believe in a little bit of discretion and a little bit of dignity. 
And...I don’t see a lot of dignity in a lot of what these people are wearing today. And 
to be quite honest, that is probably all that policeman in Canada was trying to say5. 
(Lucy, female, late 40s, White British, Interview 1, 2011) 
Here, Lucy begins, as other participants in our research did, by articulating the imagined 
message of SlutWalk.  She identifies that ‘it’ is about a liberal feminist expression of agency 
and avoidance of risk; the ability (and right) to walk down the street – even naked. The second 
part of Lucy’s statement, however, marks the limits of her own investment in the so-called 
liberatory message of the SlutWalk.  Her appeal to ‘discretion’ and ‘dignity’ which are 
stereotypically feminine characteristics could be said to be particularly indicative of the work 
that these dispositifs do (see Hollander, 2001). To be discreet means, colloquially, to be 
unobtrusive. Discretion, from the Latin discretio, means having the power to make distinctions 
or the power to make a judgement. It also means having the ability to make decisions without 
causing offence; to be careful of other’s sensibilities.  Lucy therefore expresses a belief that 
women should be able to exercise discretion and control over the self – keeping within bounds 
of (good) judgement as it is delineated by dispositifs of appropriate femininity and of safety. 
Dignity, on the other hand, from the Latin dignitatum, meaning ‘worthiness’, or the Old French 
meaning ‘honour’, has its root in the Proto-Indo European ‘dek-’, meaning to accept or to be 
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suitable. To behave with dignity, therefore means not only operating within a specific measure 
of value – worthiness – but also to accept that position for oneself.  
It is precisely this imperative to take on board responsibilisation discourses that the imperative 
to be sexually vigilant produces. Dignity and discretion are moralistic categories (as opposed 
to ethical practices) and certainly work within a dispositif of appropriate femininity. They are 
therefore integrally rooted within a socio-cultural normativity which mutually composes, and 
is composed by, rape culture. Indeed, the invocation of ‘nakedness’ and running ‘risks’ 
alongside the imperative for ‘dignity’ is suggestive of the undercurrent of shame that is the 
price of risky practices (Douglas, 1992; O’Byrne and Holmes, 2007). Lucy argues that women 
‘shouldn’t be judged’, but the implication that ‘judging’ may occur in the first place indicates 
the subordinate position of women’s bodies in respect of public space. Such shame thus works 
to mark the limit to freedom that these women’s bodies can expect in public space. Given that 
the espoused purpose of SlutWalk is to critique comments about ‘dressing like sluts’ (which is 
also a moral category) this attempt to find value in Sanguinetti’s statement is a huge taking of 
distance from prevalent SlutWalk discourse, which seems to suggest how far investment in 
these dispositifs produce (certainly this participant's) subjectivity.  
In the quotations from Sophie and Lucy, we can see examples of the ways in which the 
participants often held together antagonistic arguments, asserting that women in general should 
be able to wear what they want in public without being victimised or being blamed when they 
are assaulted, while simultaneously retaining an investment in appropriate femininity (Lucy's 
invocation of ‘dignity’) and the idea that it is women's responsibility to keep themselves safe 
(Sophie). Participation in feminist activism such as SlutWalk that contests the dispositif of 
sexual vigilance can be understood as part of a struggle between imperatives to regulate and 
secure the self – indeed, to desire and to internalise an external control over the self – and 
imperatives to be self-determining. While both sets of imperatives might be taken as 
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'neoliberal', the attempt to elude technologies of control often appeals to a liberal ideal of 
freedom. Yet, rather than understand these antagonisms as a straightforward narrative of 
striving for freedom from control, we understand the appeal to freedom as mutually implicated 
with the imperatives to regulate and secure the self, and to be self-determining: it is an appeal 
to the 'liberal' in 'neoliberal'. As we have discussed elsewhere (author2 and author 1, 2013), the 
appeal to liberalism is fraught with problems regarding its fantasies about the subject, the 
political agent, appropriate femininity and its Others. We do not, however, mean to suggest 
that any appeal to freedom within feminist activism is always-already a project of the 
privileged. Rather, we argue that the antagonisms between, on the one hand, safekeeping, 
regulating the self, appropriate femininity and security, and, on the other hand, a desire to be 
free from judgement and to be free to dress, act and occupy space as one wants, cannot be 
solved within feminist anti-rape discourses. Rather, what is required is a transformation of the 
production of female bodies, femininity, public space, techniques of safety, assessments of 
risk, modes of governmentality and constructions of the self: a whole set of dispositifs that 
feminist anti-rape discourses address. 
Of Arseholes And Lunatics 
Freedom and control are entwined in a complex set of relations of mutuality and antagonism. 
In our research, some of our participants sought not so much to resolve contradictions in their 
assertions by attempting to arrive at an coherent understanding with an agreed meaning, but 
rather to displace the underlying antagonism onto an inexplicable figure – the 'lunatics' or 
'arseholes' who commit rape. Such figures work within a neoliberal context to position the 
participants as rational subjects in the face of the difficulties they encounter in making sense 
of the antagonisms between a dispositif of sexual vigilance and a feminist critique thereof. 
They also construct the amorphous perpetrator outside of the realm of rationality – a figure 
who, in a risk-averse criminological culture cannot be reasoned with or rehabilitated: 
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Molly: I think you have got to make the distinction between when a behaviour is 
dangerous for the person and when the behaviour is not dangerous for anyone else, but 
you make a judgement on it and then...you think well why are you making that 
judgement, it’s not hurting anybody, and it’s not, you know it’s not dangerous 
behaviour.  
Interviewer: And do you see that the SlutWalk is sort of about that? Sort of about 
people...people who’ve dressed up, who are sort of saying that um...dressing in a 
provocative way they erm...is about them sort of saying, is about them…it’s not a 
dangerous behaviour in itself... 
Molly: Yeah, it shouldn’t be. It shouldn’t be. But the perception at the moment is that 
it is. You know, which is why there’s negative... 
James: Well the comment that started it all off was saying, you know, he [inaudible] in 
order to avoid rape, you need to do this, you need to behave to like that. Which is a 
policeman saying it.  
Flora: [Inaudible] I do agree with the idea that, you know, it does exist and...whilst you 
shouldn’t have to, you know, protect yourself against it, it is probably a good idea to 
do it because...it is harm[ful] at the moment, the attitude is still prevailing.  
Interviewer: Yeah.  
Flora: But...it shouldn’t happen. That’s the point. Like you can take steps to stop it 
happening to you, but you shouldn’t have to take steps to stop it happening to you, 
which is... 
Molly: Like, you know, some of the signs around that are saying that...I think as long 
as you are sensible about your behaviour, you know that, you don’t drink too much and 
put yourself in a dangerous situation, it shouldn’t matter about the clothes that you wear. 
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Flora: But then, even drinking too much and putting yourself...drinking too much 
shouldn’t be putting yourself in a dangerous situation. Because... 
Molly: Well no, but I am just saying that... 
Flora: Yeah its, back to, when you are not in control of your...of yourself. Then...you 
just need to... 
Molly: It does make you vulnerable.  
Flora: Yeah it shouldn’t... 
Molly:...it shouldn’t but... 
Flora:...people are arseholes [laughs]. Yeah, that’s our conclusion. [laughs] That’s my 
motto in life, people are arseholes. 
 
(Molly, female, White British; Flora, female, White British; and James, male, White 
British, all early 20s, Interview 3, 2011) 
 
In this extract, Molly starts by discussing the idea of judgements made about women's dress 
and comportment in public space. The indeterminate ‘it’ of this exchange is the act (or threat) 
of rape or sexual assault. Molly’s utterance situates the terms of debate in discourses of risk, 
security and danger, and is suggestive of the highly-moralised technologies of control 
characteristic of neoliberal governmentality: there are always judgements to be made – and to 
be contested – in relation to the purported harm that particular actions would do to the self or 
to others. Molly situates herself in relation to these judgements, arguing that how women dress 
is not a danger to others. This might be taken as an appeal to a liberal political position in which 
harm to others is a permissible ground for outside intervention into the actions of an individual, 
but harm to the self is not. At face value, this appeal to a liberal argument might appear to be 
an attempt to move away from a neoliberal imagination and towards a liberal position. 
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However, that would overlook the context in which the appeal to a liberal position is made: a 
questioning of appropriate governmental techniques of the self in the dispersed spaces of the 
city. Our argument here is that liberalism is not in a position of exteriority to neoliberalism, for 
neoliberal modes of governmentality have appropriated the imperative to liberty and made it 
function in a co-dependent relation with modes of control; in other words, the conditions of 
possibility for an appeal to liberalism have been transformed.  
In the extract above, after James has regrounded the discussion in the context of the particular 
safekeeping message that SlutWalk was established to contest, Flora and then Molly partake 
in a dialogical shuttling between antagonistic political positions. Twice Flora suggests that the 
risks of being raped that are purported within safekeeping discourses are real and that there are 
things that individuals can do to protect themselves; and twice she contrasts these statements 
with the assertion that this should not be the case. Molly responds by separating out judgments 
about women's dress and appearance from judgements about women's responsibility to behave 
in ways that keep themselves safe from the danger of being assaulted – aligning herself with 
the SlutWalk critique in respect of the former, but seeming to recuperate safekeeping 
discourses regarding the latter. Flora rejoins, countering not only Molly's investment in 
safekeeping but her own from moments before. The two sequentially perform a dialogical 
equivocation, ever more tightly holding together antagonistic positions before Flora brings the 
line of discussion to a close by invoking the figure of the 'arsehole'.  
In some of the other interviews, similar figures are sometimes invoked. Lucy uses the term 
'lunatics' in such a way, for example. These figures are distinctive because they are excessive, 
beyond rational comprehension of the motivations for action. As such, they offer only 
temporary resolutions in the attempt to resolve this antagonism and become allegorical folk 
devils to absorb the anxiety over the inability to make some kind of sense. What they do is to 
produce merely the semblance of common ground. Of course, what these figures also do is to 
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repeat the prominence given to stranger rape in popular (and SlutWalk) discourse – a 
prominence that enables the problem of security in public space to become an organising 
principle for governmental techniques of the female body in public space. The whole 
problematic of judgements concerning appearance and comportment is one that regulates 
women’s presence in public space; the ‘arsehole’, then, names a relation to the figure of the 
strange and threatening man in public space: 
There are assumptions made and its...there is almost an automatic assumption that, you 
know, men are stronger, and yes I fully appreciate that there are men that are raped as 
well, but at the end of the day, it is a much bigger issue for women, you have to be 
careful about where you go at night, you have to be careful about going places on your 
own, you have to think about stuff that most men don’t need to think about. And that’s 
frustrating, and it shouldn’t have to be that way. I accept that, yes, there are things that 
I can do to keep myself safer, but why should I have to, just because there are arseholes 
out there? Who don’t know how to relate to society properly [laughs]? (Karen, female, 
late 40s, White British, Interview 1, 2011) 
Here, Karen repeats imperatives of safekeeping in which the crime of rape is understood in 
terms of women's responsibility to care for the self. Not only are both the night time and 
women's lone presence in public codified, once again, as dangerous, but the imperatives of 
safekeeping are understood in terms of what we might say is a governmental imperative for 
women to reflect upon one's own conduct in public space in ways that men do not. Even though 
such a governmental imperative is masculinist – indeed, phallocentric – it is women in general 
who are made to bear its burden. Karen then goes on to demonstrate the same kind of shuttling 
back and forth between antagonistic positions that we have witnessed with other participants. 
First, she alludes to a utopian vision that critiques these safekeeping discourses (‘it shouldn't 
have to be that way’); then she expresses her own investment in techniques of safekeeping (‘I 
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accept that, yes, there are things that I can do to keep myself safer’), before again questioning 
the safekeeping imperative, and ending her turn of talking with an appeal to the figure of the 
'arsehole out there’.  
Again, despite Karen attempting to question the imperative to keep oneself safe, her 
deployment of the figure of the ‘arsehole’ maintains a governmental problematic defined in 
relation to questions of security and danger. More than this, as summoned up by both Karen 
and Flora, the figure of the 'arsehole' suggests an individualised and inexplicable menace: 
someone whose motivation cannot be understood, unwittingly perhaps resonating with the very 
discourses that pathologise victims of sexual violence such as Jill Meagher. The resort to the 
abject figure of the 'arsehole' positions these perpetrators beyond rationality (or rational within 
their own subjective – perverse – reality) and does the same work that pathologising rape 
victims does; creating an almost a pre-modern mythical figuration – a figure without an interior 
life, only surface actions who is so Other to ourselves that we do not run the risk of becoming 
an ‘arsehole’ or becoming prey to one (Douglas, 1992). Yet, here he appears in the midst of 
the formulation of a modern political settlement. His utility lies in the way that it allows the 
problem of risk to be externalised. The 'arsehole', like the ‘victim’ is an gendered, individual 
figure, and if it is positioned as the source of danger, then it functions to relieve 'society' of its 
position as the level of abstraction in which problems of security, safekeeping, danger and 
governmentality are produced. Being an inexplicable figure, the 'arsehole' also fixes the 
paradox of antagonism – or, at least, creates the illusion of being able to explain the inability 
to construct a rational resolution of these antagonisms.  
FROM ARSEHOLES TO AGONISMS 
All I am saying is you can put yourself in situations where things are more likely to 
happen to you than maybe to happen to somebody else. Like, if you’ve got all the 
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windows open in your house, there’s a chance you are going to get burgled. When you 
leave your car window open, there’s a chance that someone’s going to nick [steal] your 
stereo, so I think it’s about sensible measures. (Sophie, female, mid-late 40s, White 
British, Interview 1, 2011) 
The invocation of the figure of the ‘arsehole’ is only necessary in a context where there is an 
assumption that a rational discursive solution to antagonisms must be reached. We might say 
that the context rests upon a particularly liberal fantasy of rationality. As Mouffe (2000) argues, 
such an idealisation of rationality fails in practice because either it elides the political act of 
constituting legitimacy (as in Rawlsian [1996] political liberalism) or it assumes the possibility 
of a rational dialogical situation (as in Habermas [1995]) – an assumption that erases 
antagonism and that erases any possibility for questioning the grounds for debate. In a 
Foucaultian sense, we might consider that neoliberal governmentality attempts to construct all 
subjects as rational economic actors subject to the logics of the market (Foucault, 2008). 
Indeed, the rape myths in which women dressing in public in ways that expose flesh to others’ 
view is compared to leaving valuables on display in an unlocked car or house, such as those 
repeated by Sophie above, are an attempt to place perpetrators of rape in an economy of utility 
maximising action. The dismissal of this rape myth as the fallacious act of violence that it is – 
a dismissal performed by several of our other participants – removes one way in which an 
accounting for the rationality of different actors might lead to the resolution of the antagonisms 
surrounding rape, freedom and safety. If the antagonisms between freedom and safety in 
contemporary governmental discourse around sexual violence cannot be resolved rationally, 
the figure of the ‘arsehole’ at least allows the participants to position themselves as rational 
subjects in common as opposed to the inexplicable motivations of the ‘arsehole’. Rationality 
becomes reproduced, not through the rational dialogical resolution of antagonisms, but rather 
through a differentiation that banishes perpetrators from the sphere of the rational.  
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What this leaves intact, though, is the very antagonism that the participants struggle with – 
often with considerable critical insight – throughout their discussion: the tension between the 
imperative to be free and the imperative to self-securitisation (Bauman, 2000). This 
irreconcilability between the right in principle to the city (Lefebvre, 1996) and the desire in 
fact to be safe (Boutellier, 2004) – this oscillation between ‘you shouldn’t have to, but you 
have to’ – resonates with what Chantal Mouffe (2000) has called, in the context of modern 
democracy, a paradox.  
Many political philosophers have interrogated the apparent conflict in contemporary politics 
between liberal traditions which establish the limit to sovereignty in the name of freedom, on 
the one hand, and democratic traditions which act to safeguard the collective ‘will of the 
people’, on the other (Mouffe, 2000: 3-4, see also Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, Habermas, 1996, 
Rawls, 1996, Connolly, 2004, Laclau 2005). The paradoxical tension between these competing 
ethics, is, according to Mouffe (2000: 5-6), unsatisfactorily ‘solved’ today by the uncontested 
rise of capitalism and the emergence of a hegemonic neoliberal ethic: an ethic which is open 
to plurality within limits but which seeks order, compromise, and a ‘misguided…search for a 
final rational resolution’ to political contestations (Mouffe, 2000: 93). There are several 
elements to Mouffe’s thinking about such paradoxes that we think can be brought into 
productive conjunction with the largely Foucaultian perspective on the governmentality of 
sexual vigilance that we have deployed so far. Both thinkers offer a relational understanding 
of power as that which constitutes some kind of matter – or materiality – of ‘truth’. More 
specifically, however, we think there is a parallel between, on the one hand, Mouffe’s 
understanding of the undecideability between liberalism and democracy and, on the other hand, 
the undecideability between freedom and control at the heart of the governmentality of the 
imperative to be vigilant.  
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Our participants shuttled back and forth between antagonistic positions in which an appeal to 
the imperative to freedom (to dress and behave as one likes in public unfettered by control by 
the police, by the state or by others) was counterpoised against an internalised imperative to 
safeguard the self through modified dress and behaviour. The former part of this antagonism 
may be understood as a liberal appeal to freedom on the basis of universalistic human rights 
and of equality of rights to the city. As Mouffe (2000) details, however, liberal democracy is 
characterised by a paradoxical tension between liberal and democratic traditions in which 
liberal rights claims based on an appeal to a universalistic humanity do not sit easily alongside 
the democratic sovereignty of 'the people'. After all, who are 'the people', and how is citizenship 
to be decided? Drawing on Schmitt (1976; 1985), Mouffe suggests that the drawing up of the 
common ground for democratic debate requires a certain homogeneity of the demos, which, in 
turn, requires that the demos be constituted through acts of exclusion. It is to address this 
problem that Rawls's (1996) theorises an underlying liberal rationality that serves as the 
consensual ground rules for liberal-democratic politics – a rationality that is sustained through 
excluding those who question liberal tenets and through relegating many substantial 'moral' 
differences to the private sphere, stripping them of their political status (Mouffe, 2000: 25, 28).  
Here, Mouffe's concerns about how certain tendencies within liberal-democratic thinking seek 
to delimit properly political concerns to the private sphere converge with Foucault's (2008) 
concerns about the privatisation of governmental questions. The dispositif of sexual vigilance 
can be understood as a mode of governmentality that puts into question women's presence in 
public space in the city. As such, it depends upon a confining to the private sphere (although 
not to private space) all kinds of questions about women's relationship to violence and women's 
relationship to their own sexuality and to their own bodies. The consequences for a failure to 
abide by norms of appropriate femininity are often very public, but women's decisions about 
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how to dress or behave in public are produced within this dispositif as a privatised 
responsibility for managing 'risks' under the rubric of 'safety'.  
What feminist contestation – such as SlutWalk or Reclaim the Night marches – does in this 
context is to open up the question of the demarcation of the boundaries of the polis and to put 
into a public political domain things that neoliberal governmental dispositifs of sexual vigilance 
tend to confine in the private domain. Here, Mouffe's (2000) conception of agonism is useful 
in more than one sense. Firstly, and crucially for our argument, it acknowledges the 
antagonisms between political positions and, rather than seek an illusory rational consensus or 
reconciliation between them (pace Habermas and Rawls), seeks to engage this antagonism in 
productive becomings (see Connolly, 2004). Secondly, Mouffe's concept of agonism allows 
for the demarcation of the limits of the demos – and what interests or subjects can be included 
therein – to come under scrutiny and challenge from time to time (2000: 56-57). It is suggestive, 
therefore, of how feminist activism seeks to place the dispositif of sexual vigilance into the 
sphere of public politics where it can be contested. Analytically, Mouffe's understanding of 
agonism permits us to acknowledge the undecideability of the antagonisms faced by our 
participants and faced by responses to Meagher’s murder – the imperative to freedom versus 
the imperative to keep oneself safe – but also suggests the importance of how feminist activism 
places such antagonisms within a public political sphere wherein the very dispositif that 
produces these antagonisms can be contested.  
Of course, it is not agonism itself that leads to a transformation of thought and action. Mouffe 
frames political processes in terms of given interests (2000: 14, 111) that are subject to 
reformulation only from time to time. It is an understanding that differs from a Foucaultian 
conception of how interests are products of the dispositifs that we might seek to question, a 
conception that implies that political struggle might do better to ignore given interests 
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altogether, or at least to reformulate them. What it does do, though, is to enable an 
understanding of political antagonisms and the importance of placing them within a public 
sphere of political contestation. Thereafter, contesting the dispositif of sexual vigilance 
becomes a matter less of debate, and more of a 'conversion' that entails a change of identity 
(Mouffe, 2000: 102) and of the relationship between power and knowledge. Here, there is some 
resonance between Mouffe's (2000: 70) recourse to Wittgenstein's understanding of the 
relationship between 'truth' and common ways of life and Foucault's understanding of regimes 
of truth (see Foucault, 2008: 18-20). Crucially, contesting the imperative to be sexually vigilant 
might entail an untying of feminine sexual subjectivity from neoliberal self-governance and a 
reformulation of the very terms that pose the female body in public space as a problem in the 
first place.  
AFTER ARSEHOLES 
If the figure of the ‘arsehole’ is offered as the antagonistic solution to explaining sexual 
violence against women in general, it is done so within a socio-cultural setting where possible 
solutions to the problem of sexual violence must be reconciled within a democracy that values 
liberty, emancipation, self-actualisation and so on. It is the unsatisfactory offering that seeks to 
resolve the conundrum of how to live with rape culture. In this paper, we have argued that the 
tension, outlined here, between being safe and being free composes a form of self-governance 
or auto-policing that is tied to an ethic of care for the self and of subjectification. We have 
argued that this form of subjectification operates through a dispositif of sexual vigilance. That 
is to say, the imperatives to be safe and to be free to occupy public space function in part 
through the normalisation of specific femininities and the demonisation of certain others. These 
imperatives are, we suggest, constructed in antagonistic tension with each other, highlighting 
the problem posed by, and to, the female body in public space.  
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The response to the murder of Jill Meagher shows one example of the antagonism that we have 
interrogated, but as our research at SlutWalk demonstrates, the oscillation between freedom 
and the obligation to secure the self is a pervasive, deeply-seated antagonism (Boutellier, 
2004). Even where participants to whom we spoke were refuting victim-blaming discourses 
that accompany the imperative to stay safe, they remained fettered by an imperative to occupy 
space within certain prescriptions, those features becoming a constituent feature of appropriate 
femininity (Author 1, 2015). What this suggests is that to undo the constitution of the female 
body in public space as a problem – and, moreover, to contest imperatives for sexual vigilance 
within a broader rape culture – it is not enough to appeal to freedom as if freedom is the 
opposite of control or of security. Sexual vigilance produces appropriate femininities through 
making the antagonism between freedom and control the central object of the governmental 
relation of the self to the self. The usefulness of invoking the Foucaultian concept of the 
dispositif is that it shows that undoing imperatives of sexual vigilance requires the 
transformation of the conduct of conduct, the relation of the self to the self. Significantly, it 
shows that the struggle to transform the production of the female body and its relation to public 
space needs to contest the production of subjectivity, the techniques that set out appropriate 
modes of walking, gesturing, dressing, being in space, looking, and judging, and the knowledge 
of ‘femininity’, ‘danger’, ‘violence’, ‘risk’, ‘safety’, ‘propriety’ and so on. And, it shows that 
contesting the complex intertwining of the dispositif of sexual vigilance with the dispositif of 
security requires the refutation of how safety and appropriate femininity become privatised.  
It is here that we build on Mouffe’s (2000) theorisation of agonism to suggest how the 
antagonism between freedom and safety relies upon a delimiting of the polis in which the 
questions women face about how to act in relation to appropriate – and ‘safe’ – femininity are 
restricted to the private sphere. If Mouffe’s conceptualisation speaks of the undecideability 
between freedom and the bounding of the polis at the heart of neoliberal politics, then her 
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appeal to agonism is perhaps suggestive of how such antagonisms are important in the opening 
up of spaces of contestation and perhaps offers an approach for what to do with these 
antagonisms. An appeal to agonism as a mode of political contestation suggests that the 
antagonism between freedom and safety cannot be neatly resolved. Rather, it is to suggest that 
a space for struggle can be opened within which the dispositif that produces the antagonism in 
the first place – and all the accompanying modes of embodiment and knowledge – can be 
contested and decomposed.  
NOTES 
1. The Foucaultian term ‘dispositif’ can be understood as any apparatus that has ‘the 
capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, 
behaviours, opinions, or discourses of living beings.’ (Agamben, 2009: 14). 
2. Film available here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HiBck13rpcA accessed 10th 
September 2014 
3. The SlutWalk protest movement is a feminist anti-rape protest that took place in cities 
around the world in 2011 and 2012. SlutWalks continue to take place – especially in 
the USA – but the number of marches are far fewer than they were in 2011. In a 
SlutWalk, women and men march to contest victim-blaming discourses such as those 
espoused by Toronto police officer Michael Sanguinetti, whose advice to women to 
‘avoid dressing like sluts in order not to be victimized’ (see Rush, 2011) prompted the 
SlutWalk protests. SlutWalks are so-called because participants are invited to dress 
‘like sluts’ (i.e. in ostensibly sexually-provocative clothing) to draw attention, not 
only to the protest, but also the falsity of the claim that there is a link between what 
women wear and the possibility of suffering a sexual assault. 
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4. The authors thank our colleague, Ludovic Coupaye, for initially suggesting this idea 
to us. 
5. The policeman in question is Michael Sanguinetti (see note 1). 
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